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Background: Identifying the extent of environmental contamination of severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is essential for infection control and
prevention. The extent of environmental contamination has not been fully investigated in
the context of severe coronavirus disease (COVID-19) patients.
Aim: To investigate environmental SARS-CoV-2 contamination in the isolation rooms of
severe COVID-19 patients requiring mechanical ventilation or high-flow oxygen therapy.
Methods: Environmental swab samples and air samples were collected from the isolation
rooms of three COVID-19 patients with severe pneumonia. Patients 1 and 2 received
mechanical ventilation with a closed suction system, while patient 3 received high-flow
oxygen therapy and non-invasive ventilation. Real-time reverse transcription
epolymerase chain reaction (rRTePCR) was used to detect SARS-CoV-2; viral cultures
were performed for samples not negative on rRTePCR.
Findings: Of the 48 swab samples collected in the rooms of patients 1 and 2, only samples
from the outside surfaces of the endotracheal tubes tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 by
rRTePCR. However, in patient 3’s room, 13 of the 28 environmental samples (fomites,
fixed structures, and ventilation exit on the ceiling) showed positive results. Air samples
were negative for SARS-CoV-2. Viable viruses were identified on the surface of the
endotracheal tube of patient 1 and seven sites in patient 3’s room.
Conclusion: Environmental contamination of SARS-CoV-2 may be a route of viral trans-
mission. However, it might be minimized when patients receive mechanical ventilation
with a closed suction system. These findings can provide evidence for guidelines for the
safe use of personal protective equipment.
ª 2020 The Healthcare Infection Society. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.t of Internal Medicine and AIDS Research Institute, Yonsei University College of Medicine, 50 Yonsei-
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routine cleaning, but disinfection was performed only after theThe outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection, which began in Wuhan, China,
has become a global concern. The World Health Organization
(WHO) announced the risk assessment of coronavirus disease
(COVID-19) as very high at the global level, and currently,
COVID-19 is labelled as a pandemic. In addition to community
transmission, SARS-CoV-2 has also caused healthcare-
associated outbreaks in hospitals, leading to concerns that it
is transmitted not only through direct contact with droplets but
also via environmental contamination or airborne transmission
in specific circumstances, such as during aerosol-generating
procedures (AGPs) [1]. A study on the Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) reported extensive viable
virus contamination of the air and environment in a MERS
outbreak unit [2]. A recent study on SARS-CoV-2 also suggested
the contaminated environment as a potential medium of
transmission [3].
Identifying the exact extent of environmental con-
tamination and associated potential risk of viral transmission is
essential for infection prevention and control in hospitals and
for the protection of healthcare workers. Whereas recent
guidelines recommend the use of extended personal protective
equipment (PPE), the strength of recommendation is weak,
and its safety has not been fully studied [4]. Furthermore, since
SARS-CoV-2 infection has clinical manifestations ranging from
asymptomatic infection to acute respiratory distress syndrome
(ARDS) requiring mechanical ventilation, the degree of air and
environmental contamination may vary depending on the dis-
ease severity and subsequent treatment.
There are several reports on environmental contamination
in the isolation rooms of COVID-19 patients [3,5e10]. The
patients in these studies exhibited varying disease severities,
ranging from mild symptoms to severe disease requiring
intensive care. Additionally, some reports showed a higher risk
of environmental contamination in the intensive care unit (ICU)
[7,9]. However, a study on the extent and risk factors of
environmental contamination in critically ill patients who
require intensive care and various AGPs is still lacking.
In this study, we investigated virus contamination by col-
lecting environmental swab samples and air samples from
negative pressure isolation rooms of patients with COVID-19
manifesting as severe pneumonia or ARDS.Methods
Patients and rooms
Three laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 patients who
required high-flow oxygen therapy or mechanical ventilation
and were hospitalized in a tertiary care hospital were enrolled
in this study. Environmental samples were collected from the
negative-pressure isolation rooms of these patients between
March 6th and 31st, 2020. The isolation rooms had 12 air changes
per hour, and the average pressure gradient between the
patient room and the anteroom was 2.5 hPa. All patients
received intensive care in these isolation rooms without being
moved to a separate ICU. Each negative pressure room had an
anteroom and a restroom, but the restrooms were not being
used at the time of the investigation since the enrolled patientspatients were discharged. All patients were symptomatic, and
their respiratory specimens persistently tested positive for
SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription polymerase
chain reaction (rRTePCR) up to the time of environmental
sampling. Clinical and microbiological data of the patients
were also obtained from the medical records.
Sample collection
SKC BioSampler (225e9595, SKC, Inc., Covington, GA, USA)
and Swab sampler were used for sampling the air in each
patient’s negative pressure isolation room. The SKC BioSampler
captures bioaerosols in 20 mL of phosphate-buffered saline
(PBS) by an inertia impaction mechanism [11e13]. The col-
lection efficiency of the SKC BioSampler for 100 nm sized par-
ticles, which is the known size of SARS-CoV-2, has been
reported as 30e40% [14]. The Swab sampler, a useful air sam-
pler for capturing airborne viruses, uses a cotton swab that acts
as a filter for capturing airborne particles with 99% efficacy for
airborne viruses, previously reported [15]. Air sampling was
carried out at 1.2 m above floor level and at a distance of 1.0 m
from the patient in the negative pressure rooms. Air samplers
were operated for 20 min with airflow rates of 12.5 and 10 L/
min for the SKC BioSampler and Swab sampler, respectively.
The airborne particles collected on the cotton swab were
recovered by vortexing the cotton part of the swab in 1 mL of
PBS. The samples were stored at 80C shortly after air sam-
pling till further analysis.
Environmental surface samples from the patients’ isolation
rooms were obtained using sterile swabs, which were pre-
moistened with a viral transport medium. All the rooms had the
same size, structure, and facilities. Bedside tables, blood
pressure cuffs, pillows, bedsheets, nasal prongs, outside sur-
face of the ventilator circuit, tubing, masks, telephones,
thermometers, keyboards, and fixed structures in the room
(such as the doorknob, bed rails, floor, walls, window, and
faucet handles), and grills of the ventilation exits in the ceiling
were swabbed. All the environmental swabs were obtained on
the same day as the air sampling procedure in each patient’s
room.
Laboratory procedure
Environmental samples were tested with specific rRTePCR
methods using PowerCheck 2019-nCoV (Kogene Biotech Inc.
Seoul, South Korea) which targets the SARS-CoV-2 RNA-
dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) and E genes [16]. Quanti-
fication and trend of the SARS-CoV-2 load were estimated by
the value of the cycle threshold (CT) of rRTePCR. A positive
test result was defined as CT 35 for the RdRp and E genes.
Viral culture was performed with samples that were not neg-
ative on rRTePCR to identify the viable virus. Confluent
monolayers of Vero E6 cells in 96-well plates were infected by
10-fold dilutions of the SARS-CoV-2 supernatants from the
environmental samples. The inoculated cultures were grown in
a humidified 37C incubator with 5% CO2. After 72 h, areas of
cell clearance with Crystal Violet staining were used to dem-
onstrate the cytopathic effect. When the cytopathic effect was
observed, detection of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid by rRTePCR in
the supernatant was performed to confirm a successful culture.
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This study was conducted in compliance with the Institu-
tional Review Board of Severance Hospital (4-2020-0076)
regarding the collection of environmental samples from the
patients’ rooms and the clinical data. Written informed con-
sent was obtained from the participants. All the laboratory
experiments were conducted in biosafety level 3 facilities in
Severance Hospital permitted by the Korea Center for Disease
Control and Prevention.
Results
Clinical and microbiological characteristics of the
patients
Sample time-points in relation to the patients’ clinical
courses and CT values of rRTePCR are summarized in Table I.
Patient 1 was a 71-year-old man who presented with severe
pneumonia. He was started on mechanical ventilation on hos-
pital admission, 15 days after the onset of symptoms. Envi-
ronmental sampling was undertaken on hospital day (HD) 7
when he was febrile with poor oxygenation, and on that day,
chest imaging demonstrated severe ARDS. Using the patient’s
lower respiratory tract specimen, CT value was 23.28 for E gene
PCR and 24.98 for RdRp gene PCR on that day. He was receiving
regular and frequent endotracheal suctioning through a closed
suction system connected to the ventilator.
Patient 2 was a 67-year-old woman with rapidly progressing
pneumonia who was started on mechanical ventilation on HD 2,
five days after the onset of symptoms. Environmental samplingTable I
Sample time-points in relation to the patients’ clinical course and clin
Case Contents





Treatment Mechanical ventilation þ
Closed circuit suction þ
Symptoms Sputum þ





Treatment Mechanical ventilation e
Closed circuit suction e
Prone positioning e
Symptoms Sputum þ








Symptoms Cough, sputum þ
CT, cycle threshold; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; RdRp, RNA-dependent
either a mentioned symptom existed or the mentioned treatment was perf
treatment was not performed.was performed on HD 4 when she had a sustained fever with
rapid deterioration to severe ARDS. Using the patient’s lower
respiratory tract specimens, the CT values were as follows:
18.18 for E gene PCR and 20.51 for RdRp PCR on HD 3; and 23.99
for E gene PCR and 26.19 for RdRp PCR on HD 5. Prone posi-
tioning in accordance with the ARDS management guidelines
was followed from HD 2 to 4, and regular and frequent endo-
tracheal suction was performed through a closed suction
system.
Patient 3 was a 44-year-old man with underlying terminal
lung cancer and progressive pneumonia caused by SARS-CoV-
2. He was hospitalized two days after the start of symptoms.
Since he had given advance directives not to be administered
mechanical ventilation through intubation, high-flow oxygen
therapy via nasal cannula (HFNC) at 60 L/min was started
from HD 3 (five days from the onset of symptoms). Because of
weak breathing during sleep, he received non-invasive ven-
tilation (NIV) using a facial mask at night, starting from HD 5.
Environmental sampling was done on HD 13 when he had a
persistent cough with sputum and shortness of breath and
spat out sputum frequently. Using the patient’s lower respi-
ratory tract specimens, the CT values were as follows: 16.53
for E gene PCR and 15.32 for RdRp PCR on HD 10; and 24.70
for E gene PCR and 24.72 for RdRp PCR on HD 14. He could not
move out of bed due to oxygen therapy; however, he was
alert and using bedside tables, cups, telephone, and remote
control for television. There was an event during which
manual ventilation was performed once daily for 20 min
between HD 10 and 12 because of loss of consciousness
caused by sudden hypoxaemia as the nasal prong had fallen
out from his nose.ical CT values
Hospital day
1 2 3 4 5 7 10 13 14
.24 24.05 26.93 23.28 23.26 27.49
.31 25.73 28.86 24.98 25.05 29.65
Done
þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ
þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ
þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ
.53 18.18 23.99 34.35 27.96 40
.35 20.51 26.19 36.33 30.49 40
Done
þ þ þ þ þ þ e e
þ þ þ þ þ þ e e
þ þ þ e e e e e
þ þ þ þ þ þ e e
.32 13.97 20.11 16.53 24.70
.76 16.32 22.29 15.60 24.72
Done
e þ þ þ þ þ þ þ
e e e þ þ þ þ þ
e e e e e þ e e
þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ
RNA polymerase; HFNC, high-flow oxygen therapy via nasal cannula;þ,
ormed; e, either a mentioned symptom did not exist or the mentioned
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A summary of the environmental test results from the three
patients’ isolation rooms is given in Table II. Of the total 48
swab samples collected from the isolation rooms of patients 1
and 2, only the outside surface of the endotracheal tubes in the
area connected to the ventilator circuit tested positive for
SARS-CoV-2 by rRTePCR in both cases. SARS-CoV-2 was not
detected by rRTePCR in other samples obtained from fomites,
fixed structures, and ventilation exits in these rooms. CT values
of positive samples were as follows: room of patient 1, 30.95
for E gene PCR and 31.36 for RdRp gene PCR; and room of
patient 2, 32.33 for E gene PCR and 33.02 for RdRp gene PCR.
Air samples were negative in both cases. Viable viruses were
detected by viral culture on the outside surface of the endo-
tracheal tube of patient 1.
Twenty-eight swab samples were obtained from the iso-
lation room of patient 3. Of these, 13 samples tested positive
on rRTePCR obtained from a thermometer, restraints,Table II
List of air and environmental swab samples and corresponding rRTePC
Sample Patient 1
PCR CT value Culture P
E gene RdRp
Air e ND
Air outlet fan e ND
Air inlet fan e ND
Nasal prong/endotracheal tube þ 30.95 31.36 þ
Intravenous pole e ND
Computer e ND
Medication cart e ND
Window e ND
Window frame e ND
Blind curtain e ND
Wall 1 e ND
Wall 2 e ND
Floor near the patienta e ND
Floor far from the patientb e ND
Bed rails e ND
Bedsheet e ND
Pillows e ND
Faucet handle e ND
Door knob e ND
Call button e ND
Restraint e ND
Blood pressure cuff e ND
Ambu mask/NIV mask e ND
Ventilator e ND
Patient monitor e ND
Bedside table ND ND
High-flow oxygen generator ND ND
Telephone ND ND
Remote controller ND ND
Thermometer ND ND
Cup ND ND
rRTePCR, reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction; SARS-CoV-2, se
reaction; CT, cycle threshold; RdRp, RNA-dependent RNA polymerase; ND, n
positive.
a The floor within 1 m from the patient.
b The floor at a distance of >2 m from the patient.bedsheets, cup, nasal prongs, NIV mask, high-flow oxygen
generator, telephone, remote control, and fixed structures
including bed rails, floor, and the grill of an air outlet fan in the
ceiling. The result of rRTePCR for the air sample was negative.
CT values of all PCR-positive samples from the room of patient 3
were >30, except for those from an NIV mask (28.85 for E gene
PCR, 28.94 for RdRp PCR) and a remote controller (29.48 for E
gene PCR, 29.66 for RdRp PCR). Viable viruses were detected in
samples from a nasal prong, bedside table, floor near the
patient, remote control, bed rails, bedsheets, and NIV mask.
The results of, and locations from which, the environmental
samples were taken in the room of patient 3 are shown in
Figure 1.
Discussion
The main finding of this study was the increased extent of
environmental contamination of SARS-CoV-2 in the room of a
patient receiving HFNC or NIV compared to that in the rooms ofR and culture results for SARS-CoV-2
Patient 2 Patient 3
CR CT value Culture PCR CT value Culture
E gene RdRp E gene RdRp
e ND e ND
e ND þ 33.93 34.99 e
e ND e ND
þ 32.33 33.02 e þ 31.78 34.28 þ
e ND e ND
e ND e ND
e ND e ND
e ND U U U e
e ND e 34.23 36.04 e
e ND e ND
e ND e ND
e ND e ND
e ND þ 30.38 33.07 þ
e ND þ 31.97 34.28 e
e ND þ 30.22 30.13 þ
e ND þ 31.54 31.99 þ
e ND ND ND
e ND ND ND
e ND e ND
e ND e ND
e ND þ 34.08 35.18 e
e ND e ND
e ND þ 28.85 28.94 þ
e ND e ND
e ND e ND
ND ND U 33.09 U þ
ND ND þ 30.56 33.12 e
ND ND þ 31.39 33.42 e
ND ND þ 29.48 29.66 þ
ND ND þ 31.56 32.13 e
ND ND þ 32.32 33.55 e
vere acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; PCR, polymerase chain
ot done; U; undetermined; NIV, non-invasive ventilator;e, negative;þ,
Negative for PCR
Positive for PCR, but negative for viral culture




















Figure 1. Results of, and locations from which, the environmental samples were collected in the room of patient 3. Twenty-eight
environmental swab samples were obtained from patient 3’s room. Nasal prongs of high-flow oxygen generator, door knob, and tele-
phone are not shown. Swabs from the following tested negative on polymerase chain reaction (PCR): air inlet fan, intravenous pole,
computer, medication cart, blind curtain, wall 1, wall 2, window, window frame, door knob, call button, blood pressure cuff, ventilator,
and patient monitor. Swabs from the following tested positive on PCR but negative on viral culture: air outlet fan, floor far from the
patient, restraint, high-flow oxygen generator, telephone, thermometer, and cup. Swabs from the following tested positive on culture:
nasal prong, floor near the patient, bed rails, bedsheets, non-invasive ventilator masks, bedside table, and remote controller. The solid
lines radiating from the large green circle indicate the angle of observation used for illustration of the patient’s room.
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system. Further, we found viable viruses on the contaminated
surfaces. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first report
on detection of viable viruses on environmental surfaces,
providing evidence that indirect transmission via environ-
mental contamination is possible.
The primary mechanism of SARS-CoV-2 transmission involves
droplet spread [1]. International guidelines warn that airborne
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is possible, predominantly when
AGPs are performed [1,4]. Indirect spread might occur when
surfaces contaminated with viable viruses are touched, usually
by hands, followed by contact with mucosal surfaces, although
it is not clear if this happens with SARS-CoV-2 [17].
Recent studies on environmental contamination of SARS-
CoV-2 reported the presence of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acids on
various surfaces or fomites from patients’ isolation rooms
[3,5e9,18]. Some of these studies also suggested the possibility
of airborne transmission due to detection of viral RNA in air
samples. However, none of the studies could detect viable
viruses in any sample, which might be important to sub-
stantiate the presence of a transmissible virus in the environ-
ment [2,17]. In our study, not only viral RNA but also viableSARS-CoV-2 was isolated by viral culture from samples from
the patients’ isolation rooms.
Among the PCR-positive samples from patient 3’s room,
viable viruses were detected only on surfaces within a distance
at which the virus could be transmitted by droplets while the
patient remained symptomatic. Although the culture was
negative, viral RNA was also detected on the floor at a distance
of >2 m from the patient, where direct droplet contamination
was unlikely. This indicates the possibility of secondary con-
tamination by PPE of healthcare workers or by aerosols in
specific situations. Guo et al. showed the high risk of virus
contamination on the floors of isolation rooms and shoe soles of
PPE [7]. In this context, secondary contamination via shoe soles
of PPE from the floor near the patient to the distant floor may
have occurred in patient 3’s room. Viral RNA detected in the air
outlet fan on the ceiling cannot be ascribed to direct droplet
contamination or secondary contamination by healthcare
workers. Rather, it raises the possibility of airborne con-
tamination by the aerosols generated.
SARS-CoV-2 is stable in the aerosolized state, and previous
studies have detected viral RNA in air samples [5,7,18,19].
International guidelines have specified AGPs as suctioning,
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prone positioning, manual ventilation, and so on, and recom-
mended the wearing of PPE including N95 masks or equivalent
or higher level of respiratory protection for airborne trans-
mission due to AGPs [4,20]. In this study, NIV was used inter-
mittently, and manual ventilation using an Ambu-bag was
performed in the isolation room of patient 3. Both procedures
are listed as AGPs. Therefore, it is possible that contamination
of distant environmental surfaces was caused by viral particles
emitted in the air during AGPs. Moreover, patient 3 was treated
with HFNC. Guidelines differ regarding HFNC use in COVID-19,
with an evidence gap pertaining to the probability of aerosol
dispersion and the associated infection risk for healthcare
workers. WHO does not consider HFNC as an AGP, although
some studies have mentioned that HFNC can lead to the
emission of a concentrated jet of aerosol, which can spread
considerably. Since HFNC has no sealed portion or filter, it can
generate turbulence of the droplets emitted from the oro-
pharynx due to the high flow rate [21e23]. However, it should
be noted that recent studies have suggested that symptoms
such as coughing and sneezing have a substantial effect on
aerosol generation even without AGPs [22,24]. Patient 3 had
persistent and active symptoms of severe cough and produced
a large amount of sputum. Consequently, it might be possible
that these symptoms, along with AGPs and the application of
HFNC, caused aerosol production and contaminated distant
environmental surfaces. This finding supports the current rec-
ommendation of PPE use in the presence of patients with active
symptoms or during AGPs.
Despite the possibility of airborne transmission, all air
samples tested negative for SARS-CoV-2 in the current study. In
two studies reporting on the presence SARS-CoV-2 in the air,
the authors collected 5040 and 9000 L of air from each site.
Chia et al. have suggested that the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in
the air may be highest during the first week of illness [5].
Additionally, Guo et al. showed that the rate of positivity was
the highest near the air outlets, indicating that the concen-
tration of virus-laden aerosols differed by the air sampling site
[7]. In our study, only 200e250 L of air was collected during a
period of 20 min from each isolation room, and the sampling
site in this study was not near the air outlet. Besides, air
sampling was performed in patient 3’s room on the 15th day
after the onset of symptoms. These reasons could have con-
tributed to the absence of SARS-COV-2 in the air in our study.
In patients 1 and 2, only the outside surface of the endo-
tracheal tube was positive for SARS-CoV-2 despite severe
pneumonia, and the CT values were similar to those of clinical
samples from patient 3. The surface of the endotracheal tube
was likely contaminated by oropharyngeal secretions. How-
ever, no evidence of other adjacent or distant environmental
contamination or evidence of airborne transmission was found.
The varying degree of environmental contamination among
these patients could be explained by the difference in the
treatment or procedures performed. Patients 1 and 2 were
started on mechanical ventilation through endotracheal intu-
bation, and a closed suction system was applied from HD 1 and
2, respectively, whereas patient 3 underwent HFNC, NIV, and
manual ventilation. A plausible explanation for this difference
in environmental contamination and the presence of viable
viruses is the difference in treatment. Previous studies have
demonstrated that a closed suction system reducedenvironmental contamination by respiratory pathogens. In
patients intubated using a closed suction system, cross-
contamination by other bacteria and glove contamination of
healthcare workers were significantly reduced [25]. Symptoms
can be minimized by sedation, and respiration can be limited
within the ventilator circuit. The closed system is maintained
even during suction, which can generate aerosols, and is also
recommended in the airway management guidelines for COVID-
19 patients [26]. Current guidelines for critically ill patients
with COVID-19 propose surgical or medical masks for respira-
tory protection during the management of patients on
mechanical ventilation using a closed suction system if there
are no additional aerosol-generating events [4]. The results of
our study support this recommendation.
There are several limitations of this study. First, since a
small number of patients were included in this study, the
results should be cautiously interpreted. Second, the time-
point of environmental and air sampling was far from the
time of symptom onset; therefore, we could not investigate the
environmental contamination during the acute phase infec-
tion. However, the patients were all symptomatic with severe
pneumonia, and the CT values of their clinical samples were
similar to those of the samples from patients in the study by
Chia et al. [5]. Third, we performed the sampling of each room
at a single time-point during the disease. Therefore, we did not
track the degree of environmental contamination longitudi-
nally with the changes in the treatment. Fourth, since the
duration of air sampling was short, and no AGPs were per-
formed at the time of air sampling, no evidence for airborne
transmission was found in this study.
Despite these limitations, we isolated viable SARS-CoV-2
from environmental samples; this heightens concerns regard-
ing transmission from environmental surfaces and aerosoliza-
tion during NIV and HFNC. Furthermore, this is the first report
to show that the degree of environmental contamination may
be variable depending on the clinical procedures and treat-
ment, regardless of similar disease severity and viral load.
These findings may contribute to the establishment of guide-
lines for proper PPE use during the management of patients
with COVID-19 in the context of the pandemic and shortage of
medical resources.Acknowledgements
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